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NOTES
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS UNDER THE UNITED
STATES INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM
The United States Investment Guaranty Program furnishes Ameri-
can private enterprise investing in developing countries with a means
through which such investments can be insured against the political risks
of expropriation, inconvertibility, and damage due to war, revolution,
and insurrection. Because the program by its nature does not produce
immediate, noteworthy results and because Congress has shown insuf-
ficient interests in conducting the program effectively, it is a relatively
unknown and non-controversial element of the American foreign aid
scheme.' The Investment Guaranty Program is designed to encourage
American private enterprise to assist in providing the great resources
necessary for the development of the Latin American, African and Asian
states; these resources cannot possibly be provided solely, or even
principally, through direct foreign aid. In doing this the United States
Government also hopes to encourage the development of a strong private
sector in the economies of these countries, thus offsetting a tendency in
such countries to leave economic development solely in the hands of the
public sector.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2
The Investment Guaranty Program originated in 1948 as part of
the European Recovery Program to aid in the reconstruction of Europe.
The executive department was authorized by the Economic Cooperation
Act of 1948' to insure U.S. investors in participating countries against
inability to convert profits and capital from the foreign currency into
1. In the program's early days, critics complained that the guaranties shifted the
burden of fulfilling the capital-importing states' obligations to the capital-exporting
states, tending to encourage the capital-importing states in the wrong direction. But
the actual operation of the program has shown these fears to be groundless. A. FATOUROS,
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 117-18 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
FAToUROS]. The real critics of the program currently are those who contend that it has
been restricted too much by legislative and executive inertia. See R. LILLIcH, THE
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTIENT: SIX PROCEDURAL STUDIES 161 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as LILLICH] ; Clubb & Vance, Incentives to Private U.S. Investment Abroad Undor
the Fo-eign Assistance Program, 72 YALE L.J. 475, 487-502 (1963); Goekjian, A
Critical Appraisal of United States Investment Guaranty Programs, in INTERNATIONAL
FINANcING AND INVESTMENT 127 (McDaniels ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Goekjian].
2. A detailed legislative history of the program may be found in M. WHITMAN,
THE UNITED STATES INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT 20-35 (PRINCETON STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 9, 1959).
3. Ch. 169, § 111(b) (3), 62 Stat. 144.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
U.S. dollars. In 1950 the authorization was broadened to include the
issuance of guaranties against the risk of expropriation of the investor's
property by the foreign government," and in the following year the
geographical scope of the Investment Guaranty Program was extended to
include developing countries.5 The administration of the program was
delegated in 1955 to the International Cooperation Administration
(ICA), a newly-established semi-autonomous agency within the State
Department. Overcoming previous resistance, especially in the Senate,
Congress in 1956 authorized a third type of "specific risk" guaranty,
insuring investors against the risk of direct losses resulting from war
in the country of investment.6 Three years later, consistent with the
purposes of the program, participation was limited to "economically
underdeveloped areas."'
In 1961 the Investment Guaranty Program basically completed its
evolution into its present form. The war risk guaranty was broadened to
include losses resulting from revolution or insurrection and a new
extended risk guaranty was authorized. The extended risk guaranty
would insure an investor against any loss, including business losses, not
attributable to the fraud or misconduct of the investor.' This guaranty
is limited, however, to investments of significant economic importance
which would not have otherwise been made.' In the same year adminis-
tration of the program was placed under the direction of the Agency for
International Development (AID), a newly-established agency within
the State Department. AID is presently the administrator of the Invest-
ment Guaranty Program.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF INVESTMENT
GUARANTY AGREEMENTS
The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 did not include a specific
requirement that an inter-governmental agreement precede the granting
of guaranties for investments in a country. It is certainly not self-evident
4. Economic Cooperation Act of 1950, ch. 220, 64 Stat. 198-99.
5. Mutual Security Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-165, § 520, 65 Stat. 384.
6. Mutual Security Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-726, § 8(K) (3), 70 Stat. 558.
7. Mutual Security Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-108, § 412(m) (1), 73 Stat. 251.
8. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 221(b), 75 Stat 429, 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b)
(1964).
9. Eight such guaranties have been authorized through December 31, 1966.
Hearings on H.R. 7099 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 306 (1967). Extended risk guaranties are also available, under section 224 of
the Act, for housing projects in Latin-American states. However, no bilateral agreement
is required for the implementation of section 224 guaranties. Foreign Assistance Act of
1965, § 224, 79 Stat. 655, 22 U.S.C. § 2184. This inconsistency would seem to add
weight to the argument of several critics who do not feel that such agreements are
necessary to the program. See notes 118 and 119 and accompanying text infra.
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that such an agreement is necessary, since the program manifestly involves
only United States investors and the United States Government. Never-
theless the executive department interpreted the legislative history to
require such a bilateral agreement between the United States and the
capital-recipient country."0
The Mutual Security Act of 1954 specifically mentioned the bilateral
agreements in stating that the ICA could guarantee investments "in any
nation with which the United States has agreed to institute the guaranty
program."'" But Congress established no guidelines relating to the
content of the agreement. Meanwhile the executive department main-
tained its presumption that this continued congressional silence meant
that the legislative branch approved of the agreements as developed in
the early days of the program. Thus the ICA, adopting an overly-
conservative position, did not feel authorized to experiment extensively
with the substance of the agreements. So, prior to 1962, all of the
bilateral agreements signed were virtually identical.
By 1961 it had become apparent that this rigid agreement require-
ment was helping to stifle the expansion of the program. As of January
1 of that year only thirty-five developing countries had signed Invest-
ment Guaranty Agreements with the United States. Many developing
countries, particularly major Latin American states such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uraguay, and Veneuzela, objected to certain
provisions in the required agreement which they felt would infringe upon
their sovereignty.'12 Resistance was almost inevitable in the Latin Ameri-
can states because they were the only states whose constitutions required
that international agreements of this type be ratified by their legisla-
tures.' Yet it was in this region that wider institution of the Investment
Guaranty Program was most essential. Direct U.S. private investment
in Latin America, which had exceeded 300 million dollars in 1958 and
400 million dollars in 1959, had dropped to only about 100 million
dollars in 1960 as a result of the Castro revolution.14
In response to the proposal of the Kennedy administration, Congress
in 1961 changed the statutory language which had been interpreted to
require a rigid form of agreement. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
provided that the "President is authorized to issue guaranties... in any
10. See Goekjian 135.
11. Mutual " ecurity Act of 1954, Pub L. No. 83-665, § 413(b) (4), 68 Stat. 847.
12. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 78 and 90 infra.
13. Hearings on S. 2996 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 607 (1962.
14. Hearings on S. 198W Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 262 (1961). None ot the U.S. investments expropriated by the Cuban
Government were insured under the Investment Guaranty Program.
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friendly country or area with the government of which the President has
agreed to institute the guaranty program."' 5 However the:
President shall make suitable arrangements for protecting the
interests of the United States Government in connection with
any guaranty issued . . . including arrangements with respect
to the ownership, use, and disposition of the currency, credits,
assets, or investment on account of which payment under such
guaranty is to be made, and any right, title, claim, or cause
of action existing in connection therewith. 6
This language was susceptible to a restrictive interpretation which
might have led to a continued rigid agreement requirement such as
existed before. However the new administration, advocating a consider-
able expansion of the Investment Guaranty Program, made use of the
legislative history in justifying a somewhat more liberal interpretation
of the agreement requirement. Mr. Frank M. Coffin, then chairman of
the Group on Program Development of the President's Task Force on
Foreign Economic Assistance, had made the following statement during
the hearings on the bill before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations:
the new legislation retains the need for agreements to institute
the program, but the requirements of such agreements, especially
with respect to the protection of U.S. Government financial
interests, have been made more flexible.
Four cases can be distinguished under this approach:
(a) In all instances, concerted efforts will be made to reach
agreements regarding the operation of the guaranty program
which are substantially like those signed in the past, including
explicitly recognized rights of the U.S. Government to subroga-
tion and to ownership of assets underlying guarantee claims
paid off.
(b) There are some cases, mainly in Latin America, where
the present requirement for a turnover of property to the U.S.
Government in the event a guarantee is paid off presents con-
stitutional problems when it concerns land. The new, more
flexible, language will make it possible to explore provisions
15. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 221(a), 75 Stat. 429, 22 U.S.C. § 2181 (a)
(1964).
16. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 221(d), 75 Stat. 430, 22 U.S.C. § 2181(d)
(1964).
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that will protect U.S. Government interests adequately in such
matters, while speeding agreements.
(c) Many foreign governments interpret their constitutional
provisions to require such agreements to be ratified by their
legislatures. In a number of instances this occasions delays,
sometimes of many months, even though there may be little
serious doubt at any time that the agreement will eventually
come into force.
In cases where a responsible finding is reached that sub-
stantial progress in good faith is being made toward reaching
such an agreement and placing it in force within a reasonable
time (say, a year), the new language would permit instituting
the guarantee program on the basis of a simple exchange of
notes agreeing to institute the program.
If at any time it no longer appeared that agreement would
be reached within such a period, the issuance of new guarantees
would be discontinued. Such action would, of course, have no
effect on guarantees that might already have been issued.
(d) In a few instances, political or other practical difficulties
may render impossible or impractical a detailed agreement with
respect to U.S. turnover and subrogation rights, while at the
same time the constitutional and statutory provisions of the
country and its record of judicial processes and international
relations might leave little doubt as to its ability and willingness
to protect the interests of the U.S. Government in regard to
guarantee claims.
Based on a responsible determination of the facts in such
cases, it should be possible to issue guarantees on the basis of
an exchange of notes simply agreeing to institute the program."
None of the Committee members made any strong objections to this
interpretation of the legislation. Thus since 1961 AID has used this
statement as a basis for its general approach in negotiating Investment
Guaranty Agreements."
The number of agreements with developing countries reached
seventy-eight as of July 196719 and some of the new agreements
17. Statement by Hon. Frank f. Coffin, Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Senate-
Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1961).
18. Letter from Elizabeth A. Burton, Agreements Officer, Specific Risk Guaranty
Division, Office of Development Finance and Private Enterprise, AID to the Indiana
Law Journal, January 30, 1967.
19. See appendix A.
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resulted directly from AID's more flexible approach. Argentina, which
had agreed in 1959 to allow convertibility guaranties to be issued to U.S.
investors in Argentina,20 now agreed through a 1963 amendment, to
have the full range of guaranties made available in that country. Although
this amendment has never received the required ratification by the
Argentina legislature, AID has issued numerous guaranties of each
type to U.S. investors in Argentina.2 Even more important, an agree-
ment was signed with Brazil in 1965.22 This agreement varies signi-
ficantly from any other Investment Guaranty Agreement the United
States has made.22 Despite occasional negotiations, Brazil had formerly
refused to commit itself to the program.24 AID's new flexibility helped
the United States and Brazil to reach an agreement. Agreements sub-
stantially indentical to each other were reached with Venezuela and
Columbia in 1962. Each merely provides that the capital-recipient country
and the United States will consult concerning investments to be guarante-
ed and that the capital-recipient country must approve an investment
before it can be guaranteed.22
Most of the agreements signed since 1961 continue to follow the
same form as prior agreements but there is one important difference.
AID, unlike its predecessor, the ICA, has assumed the authority to
experiment with the substance of the standard agreement. Consistent
with the movement toward flexibility exemplified by the Coffin testimony,
AID has occasionally revised the standard agreement to make its pro-
visions more acceptable to the developing countries, especially the Latin
American states.
20. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreements with Argentina, December 22,
1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 955, T.I.A.S. No. 4799.
21. This has appanently been justified in accordance with subparagraph (c) of the
Coffin testimony, see note 17 supra. If so, AID has in this case interpreted a "reasonable
time" to be much longer than one year. The Amendment was concluded on June 5, 1963.
Titled "The Protocol to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Argentina Signed December 22, 1959," it may be found in 2 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 776 (1963). Its provisions, which are in some instances unique, are considered
further below. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
22. 4 INT'L LFGAL MAT. 296 (1965).
23. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
24. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1964, at 43, col. 2; id. at 48, col. 2.
25. The justification for these abbreviated agreements apparently was subpara-
graph (d) of the Coffin testimony, see note 17 supra. The AID Administrator made a
special finding that the record of these two governments toward foreign private
investment had been such that suitable arrangements for the protection of such invest-
ment already existed. AID Letter, supra note 18. Investment Guaranties Agreement with
Venezuela, November 29, 1962, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 374, T.I.A.S. No. 5326; Investment
Guaranties Agreement with Colombia, October 5, 1962, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2465, T.I.A.S.
No. 5210. A full agreement was concluded with Colombia on December 2, 1963. However
it has never been ratified and thus is not presently in effect.
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EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD AGEEMENT PROVISIONS
Prior to 1962 most of the agreements contained the following
provisions:
(1) an agreement between the two governments to consult
concerning proposed guaranties;
(2) a requirement that the host government (the government of
the developing country) approve each investment to be guaranteed;
(3) subrogation of the United States Government to the rights of
an investor whom it reimburses under a guaranty;
(4) treatment by the host government of amounts in local currency
acquired by the United States Government pursuant to guaranties
no less favorable than that given to funds of private United States
nationals engaged in transactions comparable to those covered by
such guaranties and availability of such amounts for use by the
United States Government for administrative expenses in the host
state;
(5) provision for direct negotiation of claims against the host
government to which the United States Government becomes sub-
rogated, followed by arbitration by a single arbitrator selected
by mutual agreement (or failing this, then by the President of the
International Court of Justice) if the claim is not settled within
a reasonable period; and
(6) provision for national and most-favored-nation treatment of
U.S. investors who are insured against war risks with respect to
compensation or reparations paid for losses incurred by reason of
war, provision for subrogation of the United States Government to
these rights if it pays the investor under a war risk guaranty, and
provision for non-application of the negotiation and arbitration
provision (5) to this provision."a
26. Agreements with the following countries took this form: Afghanistan, Ivory
Coast, Korea, Liberia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Togo, and Vietnam.
Several other pre-1962 agreements took this form, except that they did not extend
to war risk guaranties and thus omitted provision (6). Those agreements were concluded
with Bolivia, Republic of China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras,
Iran, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Spain,
Thailand, and Turkey.
Republic of China, Israel and Thailand in 1957 and Jordan in 1958 amended their
agreements with the United States to include war risk guaranties and thus added
provision (6).
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece, Honduras, Malaysia, Paraguay, Philippines,
and Turkey also later agreed to allow war risk guaranties for investments in their
territories. However these amendments were all concluded after AID eliminated
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Nevertheless several governments insisted, as a prerequisite to entering
an agreement, that modifications, usually minor, be made in the standard
text.
Certain of these modifications amounted simply to additions of
clauses which did not affect the substance of the agreements but merely
dictated procedures which, it is reasonable to assume, the governments
would have followed even though not expressed. Such a clause was the
provision in the 1959 Tunisian agreement that, before the United States
Government pays an investor pursuant to a guaranty, it must consult
with the Government of the Republic of Tunisia." Apparently this
could not be construed to mean that the Government of Tunisia must
approve such payment. Two countries, Guatemala and El Salvador,
agreed in 1960 to recognize the subrogation of the United States
Government to the reimbursed investor's claims only if the host govern-
ment has been notified promptly after the guaranty was invoked.2"
Of course, it seems very unlikely that the United States Government
would not promptly notify the host government if the former became
subrogated to an investor's claim against the latter. Guatemala also
desired an understanding that the transfer and subrogation to which
the present paragraph refers
shall terminate automatically upon payment by the Government
of Guatemala which is accepted by the Government of the
United States of America as the appropriate indemnity as a
result of direct negotiation, or upon payment by the Government
of Guatemala pursuant to an arbitral award.29
This result seems self-evident and in accord with accepted international
law doctrine. Of greater utility is a provision in the agreement concluded
with Nigeria in 1962 relating to the replacement of arbitrators who
resign, die, or become incapacitated: a successor is to be appointed in the
provision (6) from its standard text in 1962. Thus these amendments did not add
any new provisions to the basic agreements.
An Investment Guaranty Agreement was concluded with Uruguay in 1961 covering
convertibility and expropriation guaranties. However, the agreement was never ratified
by the Uruguayan legislature and is not in effect. Because of this, the agreement has
not been published and the writer is unaware of its contents.
27. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Tunisia, March 18, 1959,
[1959] 10 U.S.T. 858, T.I.A.S. No. 4224.
28. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Guatemala, August 9, 1960,
[19621 13 U.S.T. 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 5158; Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement
with El Salvador, January 29, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 4459. Neither
agreement extends to war risk guaranties and thus they do not include provision (6)
above.
29. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Guatemala, August 9, 1960,
[1962] 13 U.S.T. 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 5158.
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same manner as the arbitrator he replaces was appointed."0 But it is
probably assumed in the other agreements which do not contain this
provision that the same procedure for replacement would be followed.
Other modifications have related to matters not mentioned or implied
in the standard agreement. Generally such provisions were included to
furnish additional safeguards which the host government considered
essential. This was plainly the situation in the case of the 1952 agreement
signed with Yugoslavia which provided in the introductory paragraph
that the agreement did not extend to guaranties relating to the export
of printed matter and films to Yugoslavia.8 Of greater significance is
the provision in the agreements signed with Peru in 1955 and with Chile
in 1960 to the effect that nothing in the agreement gives the United
States Government any greater rights than those available to the investor
to whose claims the Government becomes subrogated" This provision
is meant to eliminate an ambiguity in the pre-1962 standard text. Ap-
parently the modification would require the United States Government
to pursue local remedies before bringing a claim in its sovereign capacity.
A similar provision is included in the current standard text.3 Concerning
the handling of currency acquired by the United States Government
pursuant to a guaranty, 4 the Tunisian and Nigerian agreements provided
that "the two governments shall consult with a view to assuring the
utilization of these funds in such manner as to avoid any prejudice to the
interests of either country."3 This provision is apparently intended to
help protect the host government against the possibility that the United
States Government will press for conversion at a time when the host
country is experiencing monetary difficulties. Going even further in this
direction is the agreement with Dahomey which states that "so long as
such [U.S.] nationals are unable to effect the exchange of such private
funds into U.S. dollars these assets in currency shall be entered in a
30. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Nigeria, December 24, 1962, [1962] 13
U.S.T. 2657, T.I.A.S. No. 5237. The Nigeria agreement did not include war risk
guaranties and thus did not include provision (6) above. Although the agreement was
signed after the standard text was changed in 1962, that agreement conformed most
closely to the original standard text.
31. Economic Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia, January 8, 1952, [1952]
3 U.S.T. 5052, T.I.A.S. No. 2688. Since war risk guaranties were not then available, the
agreement also did not include provsiion (6) above.
32. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Peru, March 16, 1955,
[1955] 6 U.S.T. 678, T.I.A.S. No. 3203; Investment Guaranties Agreement with Chile,
July 29, 1960, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 254, T.I.A.S. No. 4707. Both agreements did not extend
to war risk guaranties and thus did not include provision (6) above. However, Chile
agreed in 1963 to the full range of guaranties. This amendment has not been published.
33. See current standard agreement, Art. 4, appendix B.
34. See provision (4) of standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 supra.
35. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Tunisia, supra note 27;
Investment Guaranties Agreement with Nigeria, supra note 30.
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special account opened in a bank in Dahomey." 8 Such a provision is
especially beneficial to the host country, since it allows the currency to
remain in circulation during the period in which that country is experienc-
ing monetary difficulties. Finally, the agreement with Guatemala is
unique in that it established the bases for arbitration, should that be
necessary. It provides:
(a) The Arbitration Tribunal shall set a period of three months
for filing the claim, and the defendant shall be given a like
period for answering;
(b) The parties shall submit their evidence together with the
claim and the reply;
(c) In order to better decide the case, the Arbitration Tribunal
may request any documents it deems necessary, or order any
steps taken which it considers appropriate; for this purpose it
shall fix a maximum period of three months;
(d) The decision of the Arbitration Tribunal shall be final
and non-appealable."7
Without this provision the Tribunal would apparently establish its own
procedures. This is provided for in the current standard text.3
In addition a few governments were willing to conclude agreements
only if certain terms of the standard text were substantially revised or
eliminated. Thus the agreement with Chile provided that the subrogation
provision shall not be applicable to ". . . the physical or real property
comprising an investment for which guaranties have been issued by the
Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agree-
ment." 9 This provision was apparently included to assure that the
United States Government would not succeed to the ownership of
tangible property in Chile under the Investment Guaranty Program. A
provision in the current standard text would accomplish the same result
in a manner more satisfactory to the interests of the United States
Government if such ownership is prohibited by the laws of the host
country.4" Certain of the agreements concluded did not even contain
negotiation and arbitration provisions. These include the agreements
36. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Dahomey, March 13, 1965, [1965] 16
U.S.T. 976, T.I.A.S. No. 5837. Although this is a recent agreement it is discussed here
because, for some unknown reason, it most closely resembles the original standard text.
37. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Guatemala, supra note 28.
38. See Appendix B., Article 6 of current standard agreement.
39. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Chile, .mpra note 32.
40. See text accompanying note 65 infra.
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with Peru, India, Argentina, and Chile." However, India added such a
provision two years after it signed the original agreement.42 Without
the arbitration provision much of the value of the investment guaranty
agreements is eliminated because enforcement of the substantive pro-
visions is then left to depend primarily on the good faith of the govern-
ments involved. The agreements with India, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Nigeria stipulated that a three-man tribunal, not a sole arbitrator, should
resolve any disputes which might arise under the agreement. Each
country would appoint one arbitrator and those two would appoint the
third.4" This provision was adopted in the standard text in 1965."4
The first important changes in the standard text were made in 1962.
AID eliminated the clause which provided for subrogation of the United
States Government to the investor's rights under the war risk guaranty
and for non-application of the negotiation and arbitration clause to
disputes arising under that guaranty.4" Beneficial to the United States
was the revised provision which stipulated that it might use currency
acquired pursuant to a guaranty in meeting all of its expenditures in the
host state, not just administrative expenses.4 This form of the standard
text was embodies in the guaranty agreement with Guinea, except that a
gratuitious provision was also included to the effect that the United
States would encourage investments of capital in Guinea by United States
nationals and companies. Guinea, in return, would permit these invest-
41. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Peru, supra note 32;
Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with India, September 19, 1957, [1957]
8 U.S.T. 1442, T.I.A.S. No. 3900; Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement
with Argentina, supra note 20; Investment Guaranties Agreement with Chile, supra note
32. The Indian and Argentine agreements also did not extend to war risk guaranties and
thus did not include provision (6) of the standard text above. However, in 1963, Argen-
tina and, in 1966, India agreed to the full range of guaranties. Protocol to Argentine
Agreement, supra note 21; Amendment to Agreement with India, February 2, 1966
(unpublished).
42. Agreement Supplementing the September 19, 1957 Agreement with India,
December 7, 1959, [1959] 10 U.S.T. 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 4368.
43. Agreement with India, supra note 42 (first two arbitrators appointed within
two months after request for abritration, the third within two months after the first
arbitrators appointed) ; Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Guatemala,
supra note 28 (same as above, except that third arbitrator is appointed within one
month after the first arbitrators appointed) ; Guaranty of Private Investments Agree-
ment with El Salvador, supra note 28 (all three arbitrators to be appointed within two
months) ; Investment Guaranties Agreement with Nigeria, supra note 30 (first two
arbitrators appointed within three months, the third within three months after the first
arbitrators appointed).
44. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
45. See provision (6) of standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 supra.
46. See provision (4) of standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 supra.
Thus such local currency acquired might be used by the United States Government
for foreign aid expenditures.
This revised standard text was adopted in the agreements concluded in 1962 with
the Congo (Brazzaville) and with the Dominican Republic.
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ments, in conformity with its legislation, and would favorably consider
the granting of the necessary authorizations.47 Guinea appears to have
desired the inclusion of this special invitation to American capital to
reassure investors who might understandably be hesitant about risking
their money in that totalitarian state. The Ethiopian agreement, like
several mentioned above,4" included a provision for a three-arbitrator
tribunal instead of a sole arbitrator. More remarkable is a deviation in
that agreement which results in the United States Government receiving
better treatment than it would under the language of the standard
agreement. Currency acquired by the United States Government pursuant
to guaranties is to receive treatment
not less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded, in
like circumstances, to nationals of Ethiopia or nationals of any
other country, with reference to any reimbursement, compen-
sation, indemnification, or any other payment that the Imperial
Ethiopian Government may make or pay for loss due to incon-
vertibility, expropriation, and such other risks as may be mutu-
ally agreed upon.4"
Under the standard agreement the United States Government is only
entitled to treatment equal to that given private United States nationals."0
Later in 1962 AID made more extensive alterations in the standard
text. The agency was persuaded that the investment guaranty agreement
should only require of the host that it reaffirm its obligations under
international law. Thus the provision for national and most-favored-
nation treatment by the host state of investors guaranteed against war
risks was entirely eliminated,5' since it required more of the host state
than did international law.52 In addition notable clarifications were
made of the negotiation and arbitration provision, which was made
applicable to disputes concerning interpretation or application of the
agreement, in addition to those concerning claims to which the United
States Government succeeds. 3 Furthermore, a party was permitted to
request arbitration after three months of ineffective negotiations instead
47. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Guinea, May 9, 1962, [1962]
13 U.S.T. 1091, T.I.A.S. No. 5052.
48. See text accompanying note 43 supra. The time limits for selection of
arbitrators are the same as those in the Indian Agreement, supra note 43. Investment
Guaranties Agreement with Ethiopia, August 3, 1962 [1962] 13 U.S.T. 1856, T.I.A.S. No.
5134. The agreement with Ethiopia also did not extend to war risk guaranties and thus
did not include provision (6) of the original standard agreement above.
49. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Ethiopia, note 48 supra.
50. See provision (4) of the standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 supra.
51. See provision (6) of the standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 supra.
52. AID Letter, supra, note 18.
53. See provision (5) of the standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 supra.
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of after a "reasonable period," as was formerly provided." Finally, the
new standard text provided that the arbitrator's decision should be made
"in accordance with the applicable principles and rules of public inter-
national law."" Previously the agreements did not designate the stan-
dards which the arbitrator should apply in reaching a decision. Under
such circumstances the outcome of the arbitration would not be sufficiently
predictable because, without a specific command to do so, the arbitrator
would not necessarily apply international law. The addition of this
clause is consistent with AID's belief that the guaranty agreements
should require of a state only that which is required by international
law.5
6
Several developing states signed agreements incorporating this re-
vised standard text, although a few inevitably insisted on various modi-
fications. As a rule these modifications were similar to those allowed in
earlier agreements. As in the agreement with Guinea, the United States
Government agreed in 1965 with Chad to make special efforts to encour-
age American private investment in Chad."7 Like the earlier agreements
concluded with Guatemala and El Salvador, the 1963 agreement with the
Malagasy Republic and the 1967 agreement with Cameroon included a
provision for prompt notification of the host government should the
United States reimburse an investor under a guaranty."8 The important
qualification in the agreements with Peru and Chile, that nothing in the
agreement gives the United States Government any greater rights than
those available to the investor to whose claims the government becomes
subrogated, reappears in the Cameroon agreement and in the agreement
signed with Uganda in 1965."9 And the 1963 agreement with the United
Arab Republic, like several earlier agreements, specified an arbitral
tribunal of three members instead of a sole arbitrator.60
54. Id.
55. See Article 6 of the current standard agreement, Appendix B.
56. This significantly revised standard text was wholly adopted in agreements
concluded with the following countries between 1962 and 1965: Central African
Republic, Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Jamaica, Gabon, Kenya, Laos, Mali, Mauritania,
Senegal, Somali Republic (Somalia), Tanganyika (Tanzania), and Upper Volta.
57. See text accompanying note 47 supra; Investment Guaranties Agreement with
Chad, May 12, 1965, [1965] 16 U.S.T. 789, T.I.A.S. No. 5812.
58. See text accompanying note 28 supra. Investment Guaranties Agreement with
the Malagasy Republic, July 26, 1963, [19631 14 U.S.T. 1073, T.I.A.S. No. 5407; Invest-
ment Guaranties Agreement with Cameroon, March 7, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6231. The
Cameroon agreement did not incorporate the current standard text but rather employed
the standard text used from 1962-1965.
59. See text accompany note 32 supra; see Investment Guaranties Agreement with
Cameroon, note 58 supra; Investment Guaranties Agreement with Uganda, May 29,
1965, [1965] 16 U.S.T. 827, T.I.A.S. No. 5818.
60. See text accompanying notes 43 and 48 .sipra. Under the U.A.R. provision the
first arbitrators must be appointed within two months and the third arbitrator within
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However, certain of the agreements included additional clauses not
found in earlier agreements. The agreement with Cameroon specifically
requires the exhaustion of that country's judicial process before the
commencement of arbitration and the U.A.R. agreement stipulates that,
before an investor may transfer property to the United States Govern-
ment, he must exhaust "all other channels of settlement or conversion."'a
This clause accomplishes the same result as the clause specifying that the
United States Government has no greater rights than the investor to
whose claims it becomes subrogated. Less justifiable is a provision in the
U.A.R. agreement stating that currency acquired by the United States
Government pursuant to a guaranty is subject to "foreign exchange
regulations applicable in the United Arab Republic."62 This provision
would appear to minimize the reasonable conversion rights allowed the
United States Government elsewhere in the agreement.6" Another pro-
vision, inserted in the agreements with the United Arab Republic, and
with Trinidad and Tobago, stipulated that the host government agreed
to recognize the transfer of property from an investor to the United
States Government if done in a manner conforming with the laws of the
host state.6" Apparently this provision was required because of laws in
the host states prohibiting foreign governments from owning certain
types of property.
The standard text currently being utilized by AID was adopted in
the latter part of 1965.6" It comes closer than any previous standard
text to preserving the interests of the United States and the developing
countries alike. The most laudable new provision eliminates difficulties
arising from laws of certain developing countries which prohibit foreign
governments from acquiring title to real property. AID's solution, for-
mulated from its experience in negotiating with certain Latin American
countries, notably Venezuela and Panama,66 was to provide for an
escrow arrangement in these countries. Under such an arrangement,
should the United States Government succeed to the title to real property
under a guaranty, its interests would be held by an entity permitted to
own such interests under the laws of the host state. This escrow arrange-
three months of the original request for arbitration. Investment Guaranties Agreement
with the United Arab Republic, June 29, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 945, T.I.A.S. No. 5383.
61. Investment Guaranties Agreement with the United Arab Republic, supra note
60. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Cameroon, supra note 58.
62. Investment Guaranties Agreement with the United Arab Republic, supra note 60.
63. Specifically, those given by provision (4) of the standard agreement, text
accompanying note 26 supra.
64. Investment Guaranties Agreement with the United Arab Republic, supra note
59. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago, January 15, 1963,
[1963] 14 U.S.T. 113, T.I.A.S. No. 5278.
65. See Appendix B.
66. AID Letter, supra note 18.
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ment originally appeared in the agreement negotiated with Brazil in
early 1965.7 The negotiation and arbitration provision was the object
of the other alterations made in 1965; the concept of an arbitral tribunal
gained favor and was incorporated into the standard text.68 Three
arbitrators are to decide a dispute instead of one, apparently on the
theory that a larger number would be more likely to decide the dispute pro-
perly and because both governments would then be assured of having their
interests properly represented. Each government is to appoint one arbi-
trator Nithin two months of the request for arbitration and these two ar-
bitrators are to appoint, within three months of the request, a president
who must be a citizen of a third state. The President of the International
Court of Justice may be requested to make any appointments which a
government fails to make within the allotted time. New standards, not
much more enlightening than the old, were established to be applied by
the arbitrators in deciding a dispute. If the dispute relates to interpreta-
tion of the agreement, settlement is to be made "in accordance with the
applicable principles and rules of public international law."69 If the
dispute relates to a claim, the tribunal is to rely "exclusively on the
applicable principles and rules of public international law."7 The dif-
ference in wording appears to have little significance. But if a claim is
involved the tribunal must decide first, according to the current standard
text, whether or not such claim presents a question of international law
for only then does the tribunal have jurisdiction. It is not clear
under the earlier agreements who is to decide the question of
jurisdiction. One party might argue that the tribunal has jurisdiction
only when both parties agree that it has such-a situation which would
defeat the purpose of the agreements; the other party might argue that
the tribunal has jurisdiction whenever either party makes a claim-a
situation which could involve the tribunal in the affairs of a state
although no question of internaitonal law was involved. Another desir-
able addition to the standard text was a provision for termination of the
agreement. The agreement is to remain in force for six months after
one government informs the other that it no longer intends to be a
party to it. The agreement remains in force, however, as to guaranties
already issued, for the duration of those guaranties, which is limited to
twenty years. The provision is beneficial to the interests of both the
United States and the developing countries. Earlier agreements did not
67. 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 296 (1965).
68. Earlier agreements adopting this approach are listed in notes 43, 48, and 60
supra.
69. See Article 6(a) of the current standard agreement, Appendix B.
70. See Article 6(b) of the current standard agreement, Appendix B.
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spell out the rights of the parties to cancel nor the method of cancel-
lation."'
Two agreements, with Argentina in 1963 and Brazil in 1965,
resist classification under any of the standard texts. Each adopts the
same general approach as the standard texts but presents distinctive
problems; they are both the restult of considerable negotiation. The
Argentine agreement was actually an amendment extending an earlier
agreement so that expropriation, war risk, and extended risk guaranties
are included in addition to convertibility guaranties."2 The rights of
both parties under the agreement are carefully recorded. The United
States Government may not request negotiation of a claim until local
remedies have been exhausted and
neither questions under the Constitution and the laws of the
Argentine Republic as to motive, occasion for or legitimacy of
an expropriation nor the final decision reached in the Argentine
judicial process on any question of the Argentine Constitution
and laws may be reviewed by the Arbitral Tribunal, since these
are matters within the internal jurisdiction of the Argentine
Republic."
Strangely, the three arbitrator tribunal is expressly deprived by the agree-
ment of jurisdiction over disputes arising under a convertibility guaranty.
The 1959 agreement did not include an arbitration provision, and the
provision in the 1963 agreement is limited to disputes arising under the
expropriation and war risk guaranties. However the substance of the 1963
agreement does not present immediate problems since that agreement has
never received the required ratification from the Argentine legislature. As
a result the only sections of that agreement which are presently in force
are those granting the United States the right to issue expropriation, war
risk, and extended risk guaranties for investments in Argentina. No
negotiation and arbitration provision is now in effect between the two
countries.
The Brazil agreement, concluded in 1965 after several unsuccessful
attempts, was in many respects the forerunner of the current standard
agreement. 4 Nevertheless there are some interesting differences. The
agreement, unlike any other, is reciprocal. Thus the United States also
71. The current standard text has been adopted in agreements with the following
countries: British Guiana (Guyana), British Honduras, Ceylon, Indonesia, Lesotho,
Malta, Rwanda, Singapore, and Zambia.
72. Protocol to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Argentina signed December 22, 1959, 2 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 776 (1963).
73. Id.
74. The Brazil Agreement is reproduced at 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 296 (1965).
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agreed to allow the Brazilian Government to guarantee investments by
Brazilian investors in the United States. (The desire of Brazil to retain
its pride is evident.) Currency acquired by the United States Government
pursuant to a guaranty is to be held in a mutually-agreeable financial
institution "whenever economic circumstances indicate" such to be advis-
able."M Presumably this would be a Brazilian bank."0 However the most
unusual provision of the Brazilian agreement is the negotiation and
arbitration provision. Six months of ineffective negotiations is to precede
arbitration instead of the standard three. Claims arising from expropria-
tion of property are not subject to arbitration until local remedies have
been exhausted and denial of justice remains. The monetary amount of a
claim submitted to arbitration may not exceed the amount paid by the
United States Government to the investor under a guaranty. Further,
the arbitration tribunal is selected by a distinctive method. Article VI (4)
of the agreement provides that the tribunal is to be selected in accordance
with the General Inter-American Arbitration Treaty signed in Washing-
ton on January 5, 1929."' Under that treaty the tribunal would consist of
five members. Each party is to nominate two arbitrators, of whom only
one may be either a national of the party or a person whom the party has
designated as a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the
Hague. The other member may be of any other American nationality.
These arbitrators select a fifth arbitrator who becomes president of the
tribunal. Preferably the president is also to be American. The arbitrators
have a definite period within which to draw up a written instrument
establishing the procedures to be followed by the tribunal. But possibly
unknown to the drafters of the Brazilian agreement, the United States
made a reservation to the 1929 treaty to the effect that two-thirds of the
Senate must advise and consent to the written instrument relating to
tribunal procedure before it is effective.' This reservation could defeat
the very purpose of the agreement, which is to insure expeditious and
amicable settlement of disputes. Finally, the Brazilian agreement stipulates
that if either party should prefer to join a multilateral guaranty program,
should one come into existence, it may seek the immediate termination
of the bilateral agreement. This provision is unique.
LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
UNDER THE CURRENT STANDARD AGREEMENT
Each type of guaranty available presents unique questions relative to
the legal status of the United States Government under the agreements.
75. Id. 298.
76. Cf. Investment Guaranties Agreement with Dahomey, mipra note 37.
77. 49 Stat. 3153, T.S. No. 886.
78. 49 Stat. 3169 (1935), T.S. No. 886 (effective April 16, 1935).
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Since recoveries under the Investment Guaranty Program have been so
few79 interpretation of the provisions of the agreements is lacking.
Therefore, delineating the position of the United States Government nec-
essarily involves a large element of prediction and speculation.
The Convertibility Guaranty
Under the convertibility guaranty AID contracts with the investor
that if the latter encounters, for a period of thirty consecutive days, sub-
stantive transfer difficulties not existing at the time of the original
investment, AID will compensate him."0 However, since reasonably
necessary currency control by a state does not violate international law,
especially if the regulations enacted are not discriminatory against the
nationals of any country," investors receive greater benefits under the
guaranty than they would have under international law.
Under the pre-1962 standard agreement this preferential treatment
might be at the expense of the developing states. The agreement provided
that currency amounts acquired by the Government of the United States
of America pursuant to such guaranties shall be accorded treatment not
less favorable than that accorded to private funds arising from transac-
tions of United States nationals which are comparable to the transactions
covered by such guaranties.82
This language would not prevent the United States Government from
resorting directly to the negotiation and arbitration provision after
reimbursing an investor even though the currency restriction imposed by
the host state was nondiscriminatory and did not otherwise violate
international law. Whether or not the United States Government actually
would do so is immaterial. It is this type of provision to which certain
states, particularly in Latin America, objected.
79. Prior to 1966 the only claim paid under the specific risk guaranties was for
inconvertibility of loan installments. No loss was suffered by the United States since
AID sold the currency received from the investor to another governmental agency
needing that currency. Hearings on H.R. 12449 and 12450 Before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 565 (1966). However four specific risk claims
totaling $217,358 were paid during 1966. Seven claims, including several in the
Dominican Republic, were pending as of December 31, 1966 for about $1.5 million.
Nevertheless, accumulated net fee income paid by investors for specific risk insurance
amounted to about $40 million as of December 31, 1966. Hearings on H.R. 7099
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1967).
80. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, SPECIFIC RISK INVESTMENT GUAR-
ANTY HANDBOOK 14 (rev. ed. Oct. 1965) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
81. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 198 (1965) : "Conduct attributable to a state and causing damage to an alien
does not depart from the international law standard of justice . . . if it is reasonably
necessary in order to control the value of the currency or to protect the foreign
exchange resources of the state."
82. (Emphasis added.) See Provision (4) of the standard agreement, text accom-
panying note 26 supra.
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Under the current bilateral agreement AID would usually have no
basis to resort to the negotiation and arbitration provision, since its reme-
dies are tied to those existing under international law. Thus the agreement
states that currency acquired by the United States Government "shall be
accorded treatment neithwr less nor more favorable than that accorded to
funds of nationals of the [United States] ... deriving from investment
activities like those in which the investor has been engaged."83 So
if convertibility restrictions are uniform, the United States Government
has no right to demand conversion of the host state's currency which
it might acquire pursuant to a guaranty until private United States
investors engaged in activities similar to those of the reimbursed investor
can again effect conversion. Meanwhile the United States Government
would be forced to hold onto the currency, using it whenever possible
for expenditures in the host state.84 However a question of international
law allowing reversion by the United States Government to the arbitration
provision might arise if the host government continued the restrictions
for an unusual length of time, especially if valid reasons for the restric-
tions no longer remained.
The War, Revolution, and Insurrection Guaranty
Under the war, revolution, and insurrection guaranty, AID agrees
to pay the investor for direct losses resulting from war, revolution, or
insurrection. 5
However, a government is not liable under international law for acts
of insurgents unless it has failed in a positive duty of protection nor is
it liable for acts committed by revolutionaries. 8 In addition there is
some doubt whether or not a government is liable for damage caused by
military operations or preventive destruction."
Although under the pre-1962 standard agreement the negotiation
and arbitration provision is expressly made non-applicable to United
States Government claims arising in relation to the war, revolution, and
insurrection guaranty, that agreement did provide for national and most-
favored-nation treatment of U.S. investors who are insured against such
risks with respect to compensation or reparations paid for losses incurred.
In addition it provided for subrogation of the United States Government
to these rights if it reimbursed the investor under a guaranty.8 Since
the arbitration provision was not available to protect these rights, their
83. (Emphasis added.) See Article 5 of the current standard agreement, Ap-
pendix B.
84. Id.
85. HANDBOOK 23.
86. NV. BISHOP, INTERNATioNAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 665-68 (2d cd. 1962).
87. Id. at 695-96. Cf. Note, The Burinah Oil Affair, 79 HAiv. L. REv. 614 (1966).
88. See provision (6) of standard agreement, text accompanying note 26 mipra.
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value would depend somewhat on the good faith of the host government.
Nevertheless the special treatment provided under the agreement for
United States investors exceeds what is required by international law.
So the provision was eliminated in 1962 as part of the effort to make the
agreements more acceptable in the developing countries.
Under the current standard agreement the negotiation and arbitration
provision could rarely be restorted to by the United States Government
in relation to a war risk guaranty because a question of international law
would not ordinarily be involved. Thus AID would ordinarily recoup
little, if any, of the compensation it paid an investor pursuant to a war
risk guaranty. Even so, if the investor's enterprise were destroyed as a
going concern and the United States Government or its nominee succeeded
to the title of whatever property might be salvageable, the Government
could liquidate this property and recover some of the compensation
paid the investor.
Although the United States Government has less opportunity for
recoupment under this guaranty than under the convertibility and expro-
priation guaranties, there is also less likelihood that compensation of
investors will be necessary,89 or as large as under the other two specific
risk guaranties. This is particularly true since compensation is limited
to damage to physical property which is the direct result of hostilities."0
So the risk that the United States Government will suffer extensive
losses under the war risk guaranty is not great.
The Extended Risk Guaranty
If AID reimburses an investor for business losses under an extended
risk guarnaty, normally it would be able to recoup none of the loss from
the host government since no question of state responsibility is necessarily
involved. Such guaranties are difficult to obtain since they are limited to
sound economic development projects which further social progress and
the development of small independent business enterprises.9
The Expropriation Guaranty
If a host state nationalized the guaranteed investor's enterprise, the
latter would be required under his contract with AID to take all reasonable
89. This is indicated by the fact that investors are apparently not as concerned
about the possibility of loss due to war, revolution or insurrection, since this guaranty
is far less popular than the other two specific risk guaranties. However this guaranty
has only been available since 1956 (1961 for revolution and insurrection), and is
available in fewer countries. See table in Collins & Etra, Policy, Politics, International
Law and the United States Investment Guaranty Program, 4 CoLUM J. OF TRANsNAT'L
L. 240, 293-94 (1966).
90. Id. 280.
91. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 221(b) (2), 75 Stat. 429, 22 U.S.C. § 2181
(b) (2) (1964). See also note 9 supra.
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measures available including judicial as well as administrative remedies,
to pursue and preserve his claims against the expropriating government.92
If, for a period of one year, the expropriating government prevented the
investor from exercising "substantial control over the investment pro-
perty," then the investor would be reimbursed for his losses by AID9"
and the United States Government would become subrogated to the
investor's claim.
Under the pre-1962 standard agreement there was no provision that
the United States Government should exhaust any remaining local
remedies after it reimbursed an investor. Instead the host govern-
ment would be immediately obligated to negotiate and arbitrate
the subrogated claim. Thus the judgment of the United States Govern-
ment concerning the propriety of the expropriating government's act
might be decisive. Furthermore, since the agreement did not expressly
require the arbitrator to apply international law to the dispute, the
arbitrator might apply standards more favorable to the United States
Government's position."4 This is the type of approach to which developing
states, especially those of Latin America, understandably objected.
AID silenced many of the complaints of the developing states by
limiting the United States Government to its international law rights
under the current standard agreement. Nevertheless, complex difficulties
remain under the expropriation guaranty, primarily due to the unsettled
condition of international law. According to the current standard inter-
governmental agreement, the United States
shall assert no greater rights than those of the transferring
investor under the laws of the Host Government with respect
to any interests transferred or succeeded to .... [The United
States] . . . Government does, however, reserve its rights to
assert a claim in its sovereign capacity in the eventuality of a
denial of justice or other question of state responsibility as
defined in international law."5
Assuming that local remedies were available,9 if the guaranteed investor
had not exhausted them within a one year period due to the typical
delays in judicial and administrative processes, AID would be obligated
to reimburse the investor. In such cases the United States Government,
92. HANDBOOK 22.
93. Id. 18.
94. For example, the arbitrator might feel free to apply the principles of equity
in deciding the dispute.
95. See Article 4 of current standard agreement, Appendix B.
96. If the nationalization decree is binding on the courts and no administrative
remedies exist, there would be no local remedy to exhaust and the United States could
immediately resort to the negotiation and arbitration provision.
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as subrogee of the investor, would apparently be required by the above
language to exhaust the investor's local judicial and administrative
remedies before asserting a claim in its sovereign capacity. 7 This would
be an exceptional situation where disputes between states are involved.
But there would be no "denial of justice" if local remedies remained and
the situation would, therefore, not appear to come within the vague
exception involving some "other question of state responsibility as defined
in international law.""8 However, if the two governments should dis-
agree on whether or not the agreement requires exhaustion of local
remedies by the United States Government, then it might be necessary to
resort to the negotiation and arbitration provision to settle this prelimin-
ary question.89
Assuming that local remedies must be and have been exhausted,
should the United States Government consider that a "denial of justice"
remains, it could then resort.. to the negotiation and arbitration pro-
vision to resolve the question.' Settlement would be in accordance
with the principles of international law.
Apart from the question of compensation, nondiscriminatory expro-
97. Nevertheless AID apparently feels that it would not be required to exhaust
local remedies. According to AID, "The U.S. Government does obligate itself to utilize
the judicial remedies available to the investor, but subject to the potentially important
proviso that the subrogated claim may be asserted on an intergovernmental level in the
event of a 'denial of justice' in the court system of the host country or in the event that
there is involved some 'other question of state responsibility as defined in international
law.' In the event of an expropriation claim, therefore, it is altogether probable that
the U.S. Government would seek to assert the claim in its sovereign capacity." AID
Letter, szapra note 18.
98. See Article 4 of the current standard agreement, Appendix B.
99. "Differences between the two Governments concerning the interpretation of the
provisions of this Agreement shall be settled ...through negotiations between the two
Governments. If such a difference cannot be resolved ... it shall be submitted ... to an
ad hoc arbitral tribunal." See Article 6(a) of standard agreement, Appendix B.
100. An interesting problem might arise if the U.S. Government succeeded to the
interest of an investor whose contract with a Latin American state included a Calvo
clause, stipulating that the investor agreed to be treated as a national for purposes of the
investment.
Under the current agreement (Appendix B, Article 4) it might be argued that the
United States Government would be prohibited from resorting to the arbitration
provision in such a case even if there were a denial of justice, since the U.S. Government
stands in the place of the investor.
One answer is that Calvo clauses are probably not binding on a protecting state
under international law. See J. Bsmu.LY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 284-86 (6th ed. 1963).
And the United States Government is in effect "wearing two hats" after subrogation. It
is both the subrogee of the investor, and also the sovereign, protecting the state. This is
made clear by the last sentence of Article 4.
101. "Any claim ... against either of the two Governments, which in the opinion
of the other, presents a question of public international law shall, at the request of the
Government presenting the ciaim, be submitted to negotiation. If . . . the two Govern-
ments have not resolved the claim by mutual agreement, the claim, including the question
of whether it presents a question of public international law, shall be submitted for settle-
ment to an arbitral tribunal ...." Article 6 (b) of standard agreement, Appendix B.
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priation does not violate international law if it is for a public purpose;. 2
most governmental takings comply at least nominally with this standard.
However, international law is most unsettled on the question of com-
pensation for expropriation." 3 Most Latin American states maintain
that no question of international law, i.e., no denial of justice, is present
if compensation is paid for alien property taken to the same extent that
nationals are compensated. But the traditional view of international
lawyers and naturally the one espoused by the "have" nations is that
aliens whose property has been expropriated are entitled to "just"
compensation.' Two arguments are prevalent among international
lawyers from developing countries in reply to this position. A theoretical
argument maintains that this is not really international law because the
developing countries had no voice in establishing it; such a law was
established for the benefit of developed nations to perpetuate the unjust
colonial relationship."'I A more practical argument, and more defensible,
maintains that in order for the developing countries to accomplish social
reform on a broad scale, extensive nationalizations will be required for
which they simply cannot afford to pay just compensations.'
A compromise of these divergent views does not appear to be
imminent. Thus if a dispute under an expropriation guaranty could not
be resolved by negotiation, the arbitral tribunal would have a heavy
burden. It would be faced with a problem which has worried the United
Nations for years.' 7 Although several multilateral agreements for the
protection of private foreign investment have been proposed, none has
been acceptable to both capital-supplying and capital-receiving
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 185 (1965).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 185-89 (1965), including Comments and Reporter's Notes for a good summary
of the various views on this question, although somewhat biased in favor of the United
States position. See also Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": a
Universal Standard of Compensation? 30 FORDHAm L. REV. 727 (1962).
104. A lengthy citation of proponents of this position is included in Banco Nacional
De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 863, nn. 11 & 12 (2d Cir. 1962).
105. ABA, COMMI,-NaTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, SECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED
ABROAD 7-8 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ABA COMMITTEE REPORT]; 0. LiSSITZYN,
INTERATIONAL LAW TODAY AND Toi-sORROw (1966); Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility
of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am.
J. INT'L L. 863 (1961).
106. Tidd, The Investment Guaranty Program and the Problem of Expropriation,
26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 710, 726 (1958) ; ef. Karst, Latin American Land Reform: The
Uses of Confiscation, 63 MicE. L. REv. 327 (1965).
107. See ABA COMMTTEE REPORT 10-18, which, although not completely objective,
summarizes the efforts of the General Assembly. See also Schachter, Private Foreign
Investment and International Organization, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 415 (1960).
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countries.' But the arbitral tribunal would be required to come to a
decision, so the presently small number of decisions by international
tribunals on the question of compensation for expropriation would be
enlarged. As a result the international law on the issue should become
more definite." 9
Another difficulty for the United States Government arising under
the expropriation guaranty involves drawing a line between expropriation
and interference or harassment which does not amount to a "taking."
Measures commonly labelled "creeping expropriation," e.g., discrimina-
tory taxes, profit controls, management intervention, and labor regula-
tions on foreign investment, probably do not violate international law
unless they are confiscatory."' Thus the international law standards for
defining expropriation, although vague, are not very inclusive.
Neither Congress nor AID has established useful standards for
ascertaining what actions are covered by the expropriation guaranty.
According to the Act,
the term 'expropriation' includes but is not limited to any
abrogation, repudiation, or impairment by a foreign govern-
ment of its own contract with an investor, where such abroga-
tion, repudiation or impairment is not caused by the investor's
own fault or misconduct, and materially adversely affects the
continued operation of the project."'
A general definition of the term is lacking in the Act. Under the terms of
the contract between AID and the investor no action is deemed expro-
priatory if it occurs as a result of
any law, decree, regulation, or administrative action ... which
is not by its express terms for the purpose of nationalization,
confiscation, or expropriation..., is reasonably related to con-
stitutionally sanctioned governmental objectives, is not
arbitrary, is based upon a reasonable classification of entities
108. See Metzger, Multilateral Con~zentions for the Protection of Private Foreign
Investment, 9 J. PuB. LAW 133 (1960) ; Snyder Protection of Private Foreign Invest-
ment: Exanination and Appraisal, 10 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 469, 472 (1961).
109. This development may also be speeded by the World Bank's CONVENTION ON
THE SE TLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, which entered into force on October 16,
1966 after being ratified by twenty states. This Convention establishes a mechanism
through which disputes between a contracting state and a national of another contracting
state may be negotiated and arbitrated directly. See Farley, Commentary: The Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 5 DUQUESNE L. REV. 19 (1966); Rodley, Some Aspects of the World Bank
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 4 CAN. YB. INT'IL L. 43 (1966).
110. FATouRos 56; Collins & Etra, supra note 89, at 274.
111. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 223(b), 75 Stat. 430, 22 U.S.C. § 2183(b)
(1964).
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to which it applies and does not violate generally accepted
international law principles." 2
This limitation is not very helpful except in the easy cases, where the
host government clearly does not intend creeping expropriation. Other-
wise it is. too vague to assist an investor in predicting the extent of his
rights. AID in essence admits this by stating that it meets the test
of expropriation on a case-by-case basis." 3
Even if AID construes the contract wording against the investor, the
latter has more protection against creeping expropriation under the
contract than he would have under international law. But such an
adverse construction by the United States Government, in a situation
where coverage could be reasonably expected, could have a serious
effect on public confidence in the Investment Guaranty Program."4
A construction favoring the investor would be more in line with the
program's purpose of inducing private overseas investment. With this in
mind, AID is apparently willing to construe the expropriation guaranty
to include creeping expropriation at least to some extent."5 Since the
United States Government would not ordinarily be able to recoup any-
thing under the bilateral agreement from the host government, the
former would be assuming the prospective losses to the extent that it
reimbursed investors for creeping expropriation or for any other expro-
priation which does not violate international law. This would be an
indirect and conditional subsidy to American private persons investing
abroad, justified by foreign policy considerations."'
Finally, further complications are inevitable under the expropriation
guaranty since Congress, angered by expropriations of United States
investments in Brazil, added the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1962."' It provides that
(1) The President shall suspend assistance to the government of
any country to which assistance is provided under this chapter
or any other act when the government of such country ...
on or after January 1, 1962-
112. AID, GENERAL TERmS AND CONDITIONS § 1.15 proviso (1) (221/K/GT/11-65
rev.). § 1.15 also attempts a long and involved positive definition of "expropriatory
action," mentioning specific situation. But the definition is of no assistance in meeting
the difficult problems of "creeping expropriation."
113. AID Letter, supra note 18.
114. Armstrong, The United States Government's Investment Guaranty Program,
20 Bus. LAW. 27, 29 (1964).
115. Ray, Evolution, Scope and Utilization of Guaranties of Foreign Investment,
21 Bus. LAW. 1051, 1057 (1966).
116. FATOU.RS 111.
117. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, § 301(d) (3), 76 Stat. 260, as amended, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1964).
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(A) has nationalized or expropriated or seized ownership or
control of property owned by any United States citizen.., or
(B) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify existing contracts
or agreements with any United States citizen... or
(C) has imposed or enforced discriminatory taxes or other
exactions, or restrictive maintenance or operational conditions,
or has taken other actions,11 which have the effect of nation-
alizing, expropriating, or otherwise seizing ownership or control
of property so owned, and such country . . . fails within a
reasonable time (not more than six months . . .) to take
appropriate steps, which may include arbitration, to discharge
its obligations under international law toward such citizen...,
including speedy compensation for such property in convertible
foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof, as re-
quired by international law . . . ; and no other provision in
this chapter shall be construed to authorize the President to
waive the provisions of this subsection. 19
The Hickenlooper Amendment does not apply directly to the Invest-
ment Guaranty Program because the latter does not constitute "assistance
to the government of any country," unless the word "assistance" is
construed broadly. 2 ' Nevertheless the Amendment interferes with the
program's approach.
The Investment Guaranty Program attempts to treat the host
country as a sovereign equal to the United States. Thus there is provision
for exhaustion of local remedies in the host country before the United
States Government may bring a claim in its sovereign capacity, and the
dispute is decided according to the principles of international law, as
applied by an international tribunal.
However Congress had its own view-not shared by many inter-
118. The Senate Committee added the phrase "other actions" in 1963 to cover
"creeping expropriation." S. REP. No. 588, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 1963 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1230.
119. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, § 301(d) (3), 76 Stat. 260, as amended, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1964).
120. A 1965 amendment would have made section 620(e) applicable to investment
guaranties, but happily it was deleted by the conference committee. Collins & Etra,
supra note 89, at 258. Nevertheless "AID has on past occasions ceased to issue
guaranties for those countries to which assistance has been terminated under Section
620(e) or other of the Section 620 provisions." AID Letter, supra note 18. If this is
true, then AID has lost sight of the purpose of the Guaranty Program. Ideally the
availability of the expropriation guaranty would help prevent a mass exodus of capital
from a developing country as the result of an isolated governmental taking. New
investors might not come in unless their investments could be protected by the expro-
priation guaranty. Thus it would be self-defeating to stop issuing expropriation guaranties
where 620 (e) has been invoked due to isolated uncompensated expropriation.
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national lawyers-of what is required by international law of an expro-
priating government. Thus the Hickenlooper Amendment requires com-
pensation, in convertible foreign exchange, equal to the full value of the
expropriated property; in some circumstances, this is clearly more than is
required by international law.' It requires compensation for creeping
expropriation and does not impose on the investor a requirement that
local remedies be exhausted.
Thus the approaches of the two congressional enactments are con-
tradictory. A conflict is bound to arise if a guaranteed investor has his
investment nationalized by a host government. Under his contract with
AID the investor would be required to pursue his remedies in the host
country for one year before becoming eligible for reimbursement under a
guaranty. But the Hickenlooper Amendment does not give the host
government more that six months to compensate the investor or to take
appropriate steps in that direction. So before the United States Govern-
ment even becomes subrogated to the claim under the Investment Guar-
anty Program it may be forced by the Hickenlooper Amendment to cut
off direct aid to the expropriating country. The program's procedures for
amicable settlement of such disputes would thus be completely thwarted.
Suppose, however, that Hickenlooper Amendment is not invoked
after six months and the claim is finally settled by arbitration under an
investment guaranty agreement. Very probably, this decision of the
arbitral tribunal would not meet the standards established by the Hicken-
looper Amendment. Thus the President might be forced to end foreign
aid to a country even if the dispute was finally settled. Congress could
remedy this anomalous situation by repealing the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment or by giving the President discretion in applying it. 2
CON CLUSION
The current standard bilateral agreement does not substantively
obligate the host government under the Investment Guaranty Program
any more than it is already obligated by international law. To the
extent that the agreement did so in the past, such provisions have been
eliminated. Consequently several critics advocate discontinuance of the
agreement requirement so that the Investment Guaranty Program could
be implemented in any developing country.' As one states, it is self-
121. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
190 (1965).
122. The merits and demerits of section 620(e) are thoroughly discussed in LILuicH
135-42. See also Comment, Argentina and the Hickenlooper Amendment, 54 CALIF.
L. PEv. 2078 (1966).
123. See Statement of Mr. Stanley de J. Osborne, President, Olin Mfathieson
Chemical Corp., Hearings on S. r983 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1189 (1961); Goekjian 133-35; Pugh, Legal
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evident under both domestic and international law that the United
States would be subrogated to the rights of the investor in the event of
payment under a guaranty and a special agreement with the recipient
country to this effect is superfluous. 24
However the agreement is beneficial for several reasons. International
law is of necessity not as definite or as uniformly recognizd as municipal
law.'25 Thus, as AID points out, the agreement amounts to a "reaffirm-
ation of these [international law] rights with respect to investment
guaranties which may be issued by the [United States Government] ...
and ... it thus improves the position of the [United States Government]
.. .in case of dispute."' 26 The most significant reason for requiring
the bilateral agreement is that it provides in advance orderly procedures,
which do not otherwise exist under international law, for the handling of
claims. This fact by itself justifies the agreement requirement. Further-
more, the conclusion of an agreement represents an assurance to United
States investors that foreign private capital is welcomed or even encour-
aged in the particular country. 7
Finally, since the bilateral agreement provides that the host govern-
ment must approve each investment to be guaranteed, 2 ' the host
government is less likely to be hostile to the investor after he comes in.
The approval of the host government at least implies a moral commitment
to fair treatment of the investment by that government. 2
In 1963 section 620(1) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act,
which provided that all foreign aid would be ended to countries which
refused to sign investment guaranty agreements relating to convertibility
and expropriation guaranties by December 31, 1965.' Like the Hicken-
Protection of International Butsiness Transaction, in ALI & ABA JOINT COMInTEE
ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTiONS 345 (1963). Pugh maintains that there is presently no legislative
requirement for a bilateral agreement but this contention is contradicted by the language
of the statute itself. At least some kind of bilateral agreement is clearly required. See
text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra.
124. Goekjian 134.
125. Thus even though it is "self-evident" under international law that the United
States would be subrogated to the investor's rights even in the absence of an agreemenit,
the possibility remains that the host government would refuse to discuss the dispute
with anyone except the investor. This might especially be the case if a Calvo clause is
involved.
126. AID Letter, supra note 18.
127. Statement of Prof. A. A. Fatouros, Private Investment in Latin America,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationiships, Joint
Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1964). This observation is probably
not as valid as to countries which signed agreements under the pressure of section 620(1).
128. See Article 2 of the current standard agreement, Appendix B.
129. Tidd, supra note 106, at 716.
130. Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, § 301(d) (3), 77 Stat. 388, 22 U.S.C. 2370 (1)
(1964), amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 444 -by adding subsection
(1) to section 620.
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looper Amendment, this represented another attempt to coerce the develop-
ing countries by threatening to cut off foreign aid. Unlike the Hicken-
looper Amendment, section 620(1) was amended and made harmless.
In 1965 the deadline was moved to December 31, 1966"'. and in 1966
Congress wisely amended section 620 (1) to give the President discretion
as to whether or not a country's aid should be stopped for failure to sign
an agreement."' Thus the probability of its invocation now seems
remote, although AID maintains that it will continue to give serious
consideration to this alternative.' Had the amendment not been made,
several states would have ceased to be eligible for foreign aid.
In summary, the current standard agreement appears satisfactorily
to protect the interests of the United States Government under the
Investment Guaranty Program without being objectionable to the develop-
ing states, even those of Latin America. Although such a project might
not be justified by the time and trouble involved, AID might consider
replacing the older bilateral agreements which are not as favorable to
the developing states. This not only would equalize the obligations of the
developing countries under the Guaranty Program but would also elimin-
ate the vagueness concerning the rights of the parties which exists under
the earlier agreements. Then, if a developing state really desires to
obligate itself substantively to United States investors more than is
required by international law, it can sign a friendship, commerce, and
navigation treaty with the United States.' 4
Jon H. Moll
APPENDIX A
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH INVESTMENT GUARANTY AGREEMENTS
July 1, 1967
War, Revolution
Convertibility Expropriation & Instorrection Extended Risk
1. Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan
2. Argentina Argentina**** Argentina*** Argentina'-***
3. Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia
131. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, §§ 301 (d) (3), (d) (4), 79 Stat. 659, 22 U.S.C.§ 2370(1) (Supp. I, 1965), amending 22 U.S.C. § 2370(1) (1964).
132. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, § 301(h) (3), 80 Stat. 806, 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(1) (Supp. II, 1965-66), amending 22 U.S.C. § 2370(1) (1964).
133. AID Letter, supra note 18.
134. See, e.g., the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Nicaragua,
May 24, 1958, [1958] 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. 4024, which, among other things provides
for just (full, prompt, and effective) compensation in the event an American investor's
property is expropriated, for national and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
transfers of funds between the two states, and for some protection against "creeping
expropriation." However no FCN treaty is presently in effect between the United
States and any other Latin-American state.
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Brazil
British Honduras
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Ceylon
Chad
Chile
China,
Republic of
Colombia
Congo (Brazza-
ville) **
Congo (Leopold-
ville)
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Dahomey
Dominican
Republic
Equador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala**
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia*
Iran
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordon
Kenya
Korea
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Malagasy
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Brazil
British Honduras
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Ceylon
Chad
Chile
China,
Republic of
Colombia
Congo (Brazza-
ville) **
Congo (Leopold-
ville)
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Dahomey
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala**
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia*
Iran
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Malagasy
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Philippines
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Brazil
British Honduras
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Ceylon
Chad
Chile
China,
Republic of
Colombia
Congo (Braxxa-
ville)**
Congo (Leopold-
ville)
Costa Rica*
Cyprus
Dahomey
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Gabon
Ghana
Greece
Guinea
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia*
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Malagasy
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
Nicaragua*
Niger
Panama
Paraguay
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Brazil
British Honduras
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Ceylon
Chad
Chile
China,
Republic of
Colombia
Congo (Brazza-
ville)**
Congo (Leopold-
ville)
Costa Rica*
Cyprus
Dahomey
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Gabon
Ghana
Greece
Guinea
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia*
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Malagasy
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
Nicaragua*
Niger
Paraguay
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
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60. Sierra Leone
61. Singapore
62. Somalia
63. Spain
64. Sudan
65. Tanzania
66. Thailand
67. Togo
68. Trinidad-Tobago
69. Tunisia
70. Turkey
71. Uganda
72. Upper Volta
73. U.A.R.
74. Uraguay*
75. Vietnam
76. Venezuela
77. Yugoslavia**
78. Zambia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Spain**
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad-Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Upper Volta
U.A.R.
Uraguay*
Vietnam
Venezuela
Yugoslavia**
Zambia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad-Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Upper Volta
U.A.R.
Vietnam
Venezuela
Zambia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad-Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Upper Volta
U.A.R.
Vietnam
Venezuela
Zambia
Although applications will be accepted, guaranties cannot be processed until agree-
ment is ratified by country's legislative body and inforce.
* Restricted availability.
* Not presently available.
' Although agreement has not yet been ratified by country's legislative body, guaran-
ties are available under an interim agreement.
APPENDIX B
THE STANDARD FORM OF INVESTMENT GUARANTY AGREEMENT CUR-
RENTLY IN USE '
[The Guaranteeing Government and the Host Government] ...
Have agreed as follows:
1. When nationals of the Guaranteeing Government propose to invest
with the assistance of guaranties issued pursuant to this Agreement
in a project or activity within the territorial jurisdiction of the Host
Government, the two Governments shall, upon the request of either,
consult respecting the nature of the project or activity and its contribution
to economic and social development of the Host Country.
2. The procedures set forth in this Agreement shall apply only with
respect to guaranteed investments in projects or activities approved by
the Host Government.
3. If the Guaranteeing Government makes payment to any investor
under a guaranty issued pursuant to the present Agreement, the Host
Government shall, subject to the provisions of the following paragraph,
recognize the transfer to the Guaranteeing Government of any currency,
credits, assets, or investment on account of which payment under such
guaranty is made as well as the succession of the Guaranteeing Govern-
135. Reproduced from Agreement with British Honduras, February 8, 1966,
T.I.A.S. No. 5983.
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ment to any right, title, claim, privilege, or cause of action existing, or
which may arise, in connection therewith.
4. To the extent that the laws of the Host Government partially or
wholly invalidate the acquisition of any interests in any property within
its national territory by the Guaranteeing Government, the Host Govern-
ment shall permit such investor and the Guaranteeing Government to
make appropriate arrangements pursuant to which such interests are
transferred to an entity permitted to own such interests under the laws of
the Host Government. The Guaranteeing Government shall assert no
greater rights than those of the transferring investor under the laws of
the Host Government with respect to any interests transferred or succeed-
ed to as contemplated in paragraph 3. The Guaranteeing Government
does, however, reserve its rights to assert a claim in its sovereign capacity
in the eventuality of a denial of justice or other question of state respon-
sibility as defined in international law.
5. Amounts in the lawful currency of the Host Government and credits
thereof acquired by the Guaranteeing Government under such guaranties
shall be accorded treatment neither less nor more favorable than that
accorded to funds of nationals of the Guaranteeing Government deriving
from investment activities like those in which the investor has been
engaged, and such amounts and credits shall be freely available to the
Guaranteeing Government to meet its expenditures in the national
territory of the Host Government.
6. (a) Differences between the two Governments concerning the inter-
pretation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be settled, insofar as
possible, through negotiations between the two Governments. If such a
difference cannot be resolved within a period of three months following
the request for such negotiations, it shall be submitted, at the request of
either Government, to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal for settlement in
accordance with the applicable principles and rules of public international
law. The arbitral tribunal shall be established as follows: Each Govern-
ment shall appoint one arbitrator; these two arbitrators shall designate a
President by common agreement who shall be a citizen of a third State
and be appointed by the two Governments. The arbitrators shall be
appointed within two months and the President within three months
of the date of receipt of either Government's request for arbitration. If
the foregoing time limits are not met, either Government may, in the
absence of any other agreement, request the President of the International
Court of Justice to make the necessary appointment or appointments, and
both Governments agree to accept such appointment or appointments.
The arbitral tribunal shall decide by majority vote. Its decision shall be
binding. Each of the Governments shall pay the expense of its member
460
INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM
and its representation in the proceedings before the arbitral tribunal; the
expenses of the President and the other costs shall be paid in equal
parts by the two Governments. The arbitral tribunal may adopt other
regulations concerning the costs. In all other matters, the arbitral tribunal
shall regulate its own precedures. [sic]
(b) Any claim, arising out of investments guaranteed in accordance
with this Agreement, against either of the two Governments, which, in
the opinion of the other, presents a question of public international law
shall, at the request of the Government presenting the claim, be submitted
to negotiation. If at the end of three months following the request for
negotiations the two Governments have not resolved the claim by mutual
agreement, the claim, including the question of whether it presents a
question of public international law, shall be submitted for settlement to
a arbitral tribunal selected in accordance with paragraph (a) above.
The arbitral tribunal shall base its decision exclusively on the applicable
principles and rules of public international law. Only the respective
Governments may request the arbitral procedure and participate in it.
7. This Agreement shall continue in force until six months from the
date of receipt of a Note by which one Government informs the other of
an intent no longer to be a party to the Agreement. In such event, the
provisions of the Agreement with respect to guaranties issued while the
Agreement was in force shall remain in force for the duration of those
guaranties, in no case longer than twenty years, after the denunciation
of the agreement.
S. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the Note by
which the Host Government communicates to the Guaranteeing Govern-
ment that the Agreement has been approved in conformity with the
Host Government's constitutional procedures.
